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This paper is divided into three parts.  The  first summarizes  the main conclusions of
Sumner  and  Hallstrom's  paper  "Commodity  Policy  Compatibility  with  Free  Trade
Agreement"  and  makes  some suggestions  for further research.  The second part presents
some thoughts concerning Mexico's  domestic agricultural policies in relation to the authors'
analysis  on the theme of the Workshop.  The discussion finishes by presenting  the reasons
why  the  exclusion  of domestic  agricultural  commitments  in  NAFTA was  sensible  for
Mexico.
CONTRIBUTIONS  OF SUMNER AND  HALLSTROM'S STUDY
The paper addresses directly two of the objectives of this workshop, that is the authors
discuss the compatibility and harmonization of policies among NAFTA countries.
In relation to the  issue of compatibility  the authors  argue that, by itself, a free trade
agreement (FTA) based on liberalization of border measures  will be capable of solving the
existence of incompatibilities between internal policy programs and free trade; they conclude
that the  changes  in  border measures  that  countries  in  a  FTA commit to  follow will put
pressures (economic and/or legal) on internal programs.  So they favour the strategy adopted
in the NAFTA and criticize trade negotiations that include binding commitments  on domestic
policies (the  latter being the approach followed in the Uruguay Round for Agriculture).
As for the case of harmonization,  they mention that this purpose is far beyond a FTA.
They also argue that harmonization  can reduce both trade and policy efficiency.  Their view
is based on the experience  of the U.S.  dairy program, which shows that policies that vary
geographically  are compatible with open borders.
Further on the question of compatibility,  Sumner and Hallstrom criticize the inclusion
of internal policy commitments  in trade negotiations on two main grounds:  analytically  and
on the zero effect on agricultural trade of the agreements  reached in the Uruguay Round.64  Proceedings
I have  a comment with respect to the analytical  component of their argument  that
shows the effects of free trade on the domestic economics of common commodity programs.
The  framework  is  simple, stylized  and illustrated  by diagrams.  It assumes two  countries
(only one of which,  "the home country", has an internal  commodity program),  and standard
supply  and  demand  curves.  In  addition,  the  introduction  of  the  effects  of  internal
intervention  before trade is quite stylized.  I think that these  features provide a very clear
discussion of FTA and compatibility for specific countries and for other ones different from
Canada, Mexico and the United States.  However,  its simplifying assumptions  may limit the
robustness of their conclusions.  That is, it could be possible that if we  introduce into the
analysis  a  third country,  the rest of the  world,  trading partners  with domestic  distorting
policies, and market power, the conclusion  about the pressures that border liberalization will
put on internal policies may not hold any more.
Finally,  it would have  been  useful if the authors had presented  more on  domestic
policies  and dairy trade  in NAFTA.  As  well as being relevant  for the discussions  in this
Workshop, it is not clear in the text whether or not they favour changes  in Canadian and U.S.
dairy policies.  It would also be very interesting to include  Mexico into the picture since it
is a major importer of dairy products.
POLICY COMPATIBILITY AND  NAFTA:  THE CASE  OF MEXICO
I found the analytical  framework  and conclusions of Sumner and Hallstrom's paper
to  be  quite  enlightening  for  thinking  about  Mexico's  recent  economic  reforms,  its
commitments in NAFTA and the strategies that it can pursue.  This is particularly  so for their
discussion of compatibility (section  2 of the paper).  In contrast  to the earlier comments on
the possible limits of the analysis, their two country scheme is an appropriate approximation
for Mexico because the weight of the United States in its agricultural trade is overwhelming.
Sumner and Hallstrom do this themselves by suggesting that their third and sixth cases
apply,  respectively,  to the  former  Mexican  policy  of producers'  support  prices for basic
grains and consumption  subsidies, and to PROCAMPO,  the current policy of direct income
transfers to the farmers that produce  these crops.  PROCAMPO  is the policy that the Salinas
and  Zedillo's  Administrations  have  adopted  as  a  way  to  go  from  intervention  to  the
liberalization of the domestic agricultural basic grains' sector.  Two of the reasons explaining
this policy of  transition was NAFTA negotiations  and the burden on Mexico's public budget
of the guaranteed prices and consumption subsidy's programs.  The latter reason is consistent
with the results of the analysis of Sumner and Hallstrom.
There  are two  other  cases of the  authors' analytical  proposal  that  are  relevant  for
Mexico.  Case one can be used to frame  one of the arguments of those, in the Mexican public
opinion circles, that were against  including maize in NAFTA.  Their position is that with the
elimination of domestic  guaranteed price of maize, together with the maintenance  of U.S.
agricultural subsidies,  will create a huge (and artificial)  increase in Mexico's  imports of the
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grain.  Of course,  in  this aspect  of the  argument,  those  opposed  to  including  maize  in
NAFTA ignore Mexico's maize producers competitive stand vis a vis the United States, even
without subsidies.  In addition, they included  in their argument the question of food self-
sufficiency.
In the case of Mexico's domestic  agricultural  policies,  it is important  to say that in
addition to PROCAMPO,  the Administration  of President Zedillo has included PRODUCE,
a governmental  scheme to subsidize agricultural producers.'  We can frame this program in
case two of Sumner and Hallstrom's paper.
In principle, and as stated in the sixth case of  the paper, PROCAMPO posses no limit
to trade flows.  On the other hand, PRODUCE could be taken as an implicit trade barrier that
might be subject to trade disputes (this is specially so for those commodities  competing with
U.S. production  such as horticultural  goods).  However,  and  at the same time, the  lack of
explicit  commitments  in  NAFTA  about  domestic  programs  has  allowed  the  current
government of Mexico to include PRODUCE in their agricultural policies.  This  possibility
could be added to the arguments of Sumner and Hallstrom in favour of concentrating  a FTA
on border measures since it gives  more room of action to national  governments to pursue
their rural development  objectives.
We have shown that programs  such as PRODUCE are required in Mexico, because
they have better results with respect to other "neutral"  income transfers  as PROCAMPO in
rising productivity and income in rural areas (Taylor, J.E., A. Yunez-Naude  and S. Hampton,
forthcoming).  PROCAMPO can lower the exports to Mexico of its NAFTA partners,  but
programs  as  PRODUCE  definitely  reduces  more  than  PROCAMPO  the  pressures  to
international  migration.  To point this out is relevant to this Workshop since it could help to
improve understanding among advisors and policy makers of  Mexico's North American trade
partners.
On Sumner and Hallstrom's doubts about pursuing the harmonization of agricultural
policies between NAFTA members,  I add the following.  At least for the time being,  it will
be unwise for Mexico to follow this objective.  As argued in the final part of my discussion,
this is  so because  the enormous heterogeneity  of its  countryside and  the  lack of a clear
understanding of the effects of economic reforms on the components of rural Mexico require
time and flexibility  in the design of its agricultural policies.
PRODUCE forms an important part of the "Alianza para el Campo", the governmental
agricultural program for 1995-2000.  It has three components:  1)  the "capitalization" program
that gives subsidies to those producers  buying machinery and equipment for irrigation and
fertilization,  as well as for those establishing  grass  areas for livestock; 2)  the "productive
conversion" program, that helps those farmers that change their activities from annual crops to
plantations;  and 3) the program for the protection of natural resources, which supports those
projects that promote a more rational use of land and water.
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REFLECTIONS ABOUT  MEXICO
Mexico was one of the  first Latin American  countries  to follow  a radical  change in
its development  strategy:  from deep  government  intervention to economic  liberalization.
In  fact,  beginning  with the  debt crisis of 1982,  the  Mexican  governments  have radically
reoriented  its development policy  from import substitution to outward  orientation.
In the agricultural  area this has meant-  among other policy changes:  the abolition
of import  controls  of "basic  staples";  the  elimination  of producers'  price  supports;  the
reduction or elimination of State owned enterprises activities  in buying,  importing, storing,
processing  and  selling  "basic  crops"  (corn,  beans,  rice,  wheat,  oilseeds  and  barley);  the
reduction of government subsidies in rural credit  and insurance; and the privatization  of  the
irrigation  system and of property rights  in land (the details are present  in Yunez-Naude,  A.,
1995).  These  changes  were  done  before  NAFTA  and  are  in  line with  the  process  of
compatibility  discussed previously.
The  last  two  Administrations  and  the  current  one  expect  that,  with  economic
liberalization,  macroeconomic  stability  is going to be achieved  and,  together with NAFTA
and the increase  in foreign investment promoted  by this trade agreement,  a new vigorous
stage of economic development will arise.
With respect to the agricultural  sector, the reduction of State intervention  is expected
to lead to the efficient use of the resources  of rural Mexico;  the market  forces will reallocate
them to those activities  in which the country has comparative  advantage.  The governments
have not been too worried about the consequences of this change on food self-sufficiency  and
on rural emigration.  PROCAMPO  and PRODUCE  do not have  these purposes, although
they may reduce the pressures for rural emigration.
Most of the studies, discussions and official expectations on the effects of the reforms
and  NAFTA  on  the  agricultural  sector  are  too  aggregated  and  ignore  the  enormous
heterogeneity  prevailing  in Mexico's  countryside.  They  also ignore the fact that most of
maize  and bean production-  the basic foods  in Mexicans' diet-  is  done not by modem
agriculture,  but by family units  of production  and  consumption,  whose members  are also
engaged  in  activities  other  than  the  production  of  staples  (internal  and  international
migration, earning wages in regional labour markets, and income  in commerce and livestock
production,  etc.).2
The  consideration  of rural  heterogeneity  as  a  fundamental  feature of the  agrarian
structure of Mexico has  led us to conclude  that the effects and size of structural  change in
agriculture  depend  on the type of producers  considered  and on the linkages they have with
the product  and labour markets.  On the contrary, most of the studies and official views  on
this respect assume the existence of complete markets  in rural Mexico, and, furthermore, that
2 Such heterogeneity  is present both at the microeconomic  and regional levels.  Modem
farms (located mainly in the North and West Coast of Mexico)  coexist with traditional and
intermediate  farms (most of them  in the East,  Center and South West of the country).
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these markets are not segmented and/or that economic agents  face no transaction costs.  So,
their results  and policy recommendations  can only be applicable  to modem agriculture  and,
at the most, to a portion of intermediate  farmers.  Consequently,  the estimated or expected
effects  (both,  positive  and  negative)  of  policy  reforms  on  agriculture  have  been
overestimated.3 At the same time, the assumption that all relevant markets are present and
well  functioning  has  limited  the  study  of the  effects  of  liberalization  on  traditional
agriculture,  and,  more importantly,  has meant the lack of serious consideration  of them in
policy design.
4
There is evidence that liberalization  and the current economic  crisis of Mexico  have
led to a "process of regression"  of peasant households whose income depends heavily on the
domestic  labour markets.  The  recent developments  of the Mexican  economy  have  also
increased emigration to the United States and the pressure on farmers' natural resources.
5 To
this the growth of rural political unrest must be added.
To avoid these consequences,  program addressing directly the peasantry are required
(for example,  investments  in technical  education,  infrastructure, etc.).  This, together with
the positive effects that PRODUCE will bring about, leads me to conclude that-  in addition
to Sumner and Hallstrom arguments - it was appropriate not to include internal agricultural
policy liberalization  commitments in NAFTA.
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